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Abstract
Household characteristics may have long-run e¤ects on individual outcomes in adult-
hood. For instance, individuals who lived when young in households experiencing nan-
cial problems are more likely to be poor when adults. Governments try to reduce these
e¤ects and to promote equality of opportunity. The objective of this paper is to check
whether public expenditure has a long-run e¤ect in reducing the probability of being
poor when adult, and to what extent. Our main nding is that public expenditure on
education has a strong long-run e¤ect on reducing incidence of poverty in adulthood.
We also nd that this e¤ect is concentrated mainly among individuals who have parents
with a low level of education.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature documenting how inequality has increased during the last
decades in many developed countries (see Piketty, 2014 or Atkinson, 2010 for the EU; Atkin-
son et al., 2011 or Jenkins et al., 2013 for the US). For instance, in most OECD countries the
gap between the rich and the poor has widened continuously prior to 2008 (OECD, 2011).
In addition, recent OECD data (OECD, 2013) show that the global economic crisis has re-
duced incomes in most countries. However, this reduction is not shared evenly across the
two extremes of the income distribution as there are larger reductions at the bottom part
of the distribution. This fact suggests further increases in inequality and poverty. It is also
well-known that living in poverty during childhood has long-run negative e¤ects. Children
from poor families are more likely to be poor when adults, are also more prone to su¤er
health problems, and are less likely to stay in school after the end of compulsory education
(see Corak, 2006 or Jenkins and Siedler, 2007 and references therein). These long-run e¤ects
reect the degree of intergenerational mobility in a society. In countries where social mobil-
ity is low, being poor when young is a good predictor of the probability of being poor when
adult.
There are at least two plausible mechanisms underlying the intergenerational transmission
of poverty. First, there may be genetic di¤erences in ability that are transmitted from
parents to children, leading to intergenerational persistence in poverty. Second, rich parents
invest more in the human capital of their children, who end up with more education. This
second mechanism suggests a role for government intervention to equalize opportunities. In
particular, public intervention at early stages is seen as one of the most important tools to
reduce the long-run e¤ects of poverty and to promote equality of opportunity.
Our objective is to estimate the e¤ects of public expenditure on poverty status in adult-
hood in Europe. The notion of poverty used is income-based, reecting the main approach
in the literature.1 In order to do so, we combine individual and aggregate variables by merg-
ing data from the 2005 and 2011 cross sections of the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with data on public expenditure that we retrieve from
the United Nations Educational, Scientic and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) database.
The 2005 and 2011 cross sections of EU-SILC include a special module on Intergenerational
transmission of poverty.The database we construct allow us to analyze which factors con-
1As measures of social exclusion, material deprivation and material hardship are becoming more and more
available, the concept of multidimensional poverty is increasingly used. For instance, Figari (2012) analyses
the relationship between deprivation, income and other individual dimensions over time, in eleven European
countries. For an overview of this literature see Morelli et al. (2015) or Nolan and Marx (2009).
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tribute to cross-country and cohort di¤erences in the probability of falling below the poverty
line.
Ideally, we would like to have data on all categories of public expenditure, in particular
those items that can be categorized as expenditure in children. We would also need data on
public expenditure covering a period of time as long as possible. These two requirements lead
us to use data on public spending dedicated to education. In particular, we have data on pub-
lic education spending since 1971 that are disaggregated at three levels (primary, secondary,
tertiary) for a number of European countries. This could be seen as a potential drawback
of our approach, since any e¤ect that we may nd of public expenditure on adult poverty
status could be attributable not to spending in education per se, but to public spending in
general. However, in a previous work Mayer and Lopoo (2008) study the long run e¤ect
of public spending on intergenerational income mobility in the USA. They nd that inter-
generational mobility is greater in high-spending states, compared to low-spending states.
Interestingly, when they disaggregate by categories of spending they nd that spending on
primary and secondary education is the public spending that has the largest impact on low-
income childrens future income. Regarding the period of time for which we have available
data on spending, the oldest data go back to 1971, allowing us to consider individuals born
from 1954 and later. We follow an approach similar to that of Mayer and Lopoo (2008) and
try several denitions of per capita expenditure to capture the level of public investment per
individual. First, we assign to each individual average expenditure per pupil at the three
levels when the individual was between the ages of 15 and 17. Next, we consider other more
restrictive denitions as the sum of expenditure per pupil only in primary and secondary
education, and the expenditure at each level separately.
The rst result we get is that expenditure on primary and secondary education seem
to have a strong long-run e¤ect on reducing the incidence of poverty in adulthood. As an
illustration, an increase of one standard deviation in expenditure on secondary education is
associated with a reduction of 0.61 percentage points in adult poverty, which is an important
reduction as it represents 5% of the mean poverty rate (12.11). This association between
public expenditure and poverty vanishes when we consider expenditure in tertiary education.
Next, we compute the e¤ects of expenditure for di¤erent sub-groups of individuals according
to the characteristics of the family in which they were raised. In particular, we divide
individuals into two groups depending on the level of education of their parents. Our second
result is that the benecial e¤ect of public expenditure on education is concentrated mostly
among individuals with low-educated parents. This result holds for most of the models we
estimate. For instance, an increase in expenditure in secondary education of the size of one
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standard deviation is associated with a reduction of 1.24 percentage points in the incidence
of poverty in adulthood for children from low-educated families. At the same time, we nd
that expenditure is positively associated with adult poverty for individuals from educated
families. This result underscores that the e¤ects of public expenditure are coming through
individuals whose parents had low levels of education. A likely implication is that public
expenditure helps to increase intergenerational mobility.
The e¤ects we have obtained can be explained by a simple human capital model in which
individuals outcomes today are a function of both their own endowments and of human
capital investments received while young. For instance, an increase in public expenditure
may push some individuals to undertake post-compulsory education. This, in turn, may
reduce the probability of being below the poverty line in adulthood. There are several works
documenting a positive e¤ect of education spending on later outcomes. Some studies nd a
positive e¤ects on test scores (see Hedges et al., 1992) whereas others do not nd a signicant
impact (see Hanushek, 1996, 2001). Grogger (1996) nds that state per-pupil spending on
compulsory education is associated with higher post-schooling wages. Within this literature,
there are other authors who use alternative identication strategies. For example, Meghir and
Palme (2005) evaluate the impact of a school reform that took place in the 1950s in Sweden
on educational attainment and earnings. This reform consisted of increasing compulsory
schooling, among other aspects, and thus can be seen as an increase in per capita public
expenditure on education. They nd that this reform increased both educational attainment
and earnings of those individuals whose fathers had only compulsory education.
Our identication strategy to assess the impact of government spending on individuals
poverty status consists of exploiting country and time variation in expenditure. We identify
the e¤ect of public intervention by exploiting changes in spending across countries from the
initial period in our sample. As di¤erent countries experience di¤erent economic situations
that might have di¤erent e¤ects on di¤erent cohorts, we also control for other country-cohort
variables, such as per capita GDP and income inequality during childhood. However, there
are many other factors that may have changed within particular countries between the time
the individual was a teenager and the expenditure was made and the moment when poverty
status is determined. To address this problem, we include the change in per capita GDP
and the change in our measure of inequality from the time the individual was 15-17 until the
year of survey response, respectively. These two additional variables capture country-specic
time trends. Finally, we perform a number of robustness checks. In particular, we check the
validity of our results to alternative measures of parental circumstances and current poverty
status and to alternative specications of the model. We also implemented a falsication
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exercise for the exposure to public expenditure.
The paper is related to the literature that studies the long-run e¤ects of government
spending on adult outcomes as income or poverty. The most closely related papers to ours are
Mayer and Lopoo (2008), mentioned above, and Jackson et al. (2016). The former assesses
the relationship between government spending and intergenerational economic mobility using
PSID data together with data on state spending from the U.S. Census of Governments. The
latter also uses U.S. data and nds a signicant e¤ect of increased school spending on children
from poor families. In particular, they nd that an increase of 10% in expenditure for all
years of K-12 education reduces the incidence of adult poverty by 3.2 percentage points.
In addition to public expenditure, the previous literature has shown that individualsso-
cioeconomic background is also a crucial determinant of adult poverty. There is substantial
evidence that poverty is to a large extent inherited across generations. Recently, Bellani and
Bia (2016) using also data from EU-SILC 2005 and 2011 nd that exposure to poverty in
childhood reduces equivalized income in adulthood by about 5% and increases the proba-
bility of falling below the poverty threshold by about 6 percentage points. For a review of
this literature, see Jäntti and Jenkins (2014). While experiencing nancial problems during
childhood is shown to have a strong impact on poverty in adulthood, other dimensions of
family background, as parental education, are associated with future poverty. For example,
Corcoran and Adams (1997) were among the rst who attempted to separate the impact
of poverty during childhood from other family background characteristics (such as parental
schooling). Blanden and Gregg (2004) perform a similar study. Both studies found that
individuals with better educated parents are less likely to be poor themselves. Hertz et al.
(2007) report strong correlations between schooling of parents and children for many coun-
tries. Holmlund et al. (2011) provide a survey on the di¤erent methodologies used to study
the causal e¤ect of parents schooling on childrens schooling. Recently, Piopiunik (2014)
suggests that the channel for this relationship could be that parents with more education
value good school performance of their children more highly and are more likely to believe
that schooling is good for them. Finally, see Marx et al. (2014) for a recent survey of these
types of studies. In this paper, we control for the role of parental background while studying
the long-run e¤ect of public expenditure on adult poverty.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we focus on intergener-
ational poverty transmission rather than on transmission of income, as most of this literature
does. Surprisingly, there is almost no evidence on the potential mitigating e¤ect of public
expenditure on poverty, despite the recent trends in poverty and income inequality. Second,
we focus on a group of European countries using data from the EU-SILC. Finally, we also
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add to this debate by using a more narrowly dened measure of expenditure on childrens
schooling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the paper. Section
3 presents the empirical model. We discuss our empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
Estimating whether government expenditure has a long-term e¤ect on reducing poverty re-
quires individual-level data on adults income together with information on the characteristics
of the household where that adult grew up. It also requires a source of variation in govern-
ment expenditure. In this study, we merge data drawn from both the 2005 and 2011 cross
sections of the EU-SILC database with data from the UNESCO database for Education. We
build a database comprising 16 European countries. These are the countries in the EU-SILC
database for which we have enough historical data on public expenditure.2
The reason for using the 2005 and 2011 cross sections of the EU-SILC database is that they
include special modules on intergenerational transmission of poverty.3 Using these modules
requires one to exclude from the 2005 and 2011 cross sections all individuals who are not in the
age range of the module (25-65) and are not the selected respondent. These modules contain
retrospective information on parental background and childhood circumstances including, in
particular, family composition, year of birth of parents, occupation, and level of education of
parents. To assess the long-run e¤ect of household characteristics, we exclude all individuals
who lived in a collective house or in some institution when young. Individuals also provide
retrospective information about the socio-economic situation of the household they lived in
when teenagers. All these variables give us valuable information on individual circumstances
that prevailed before the end of compulsory education. Individuals report the highest level
of education attained by their mother and their father. We summarize this information by
building a dummy variable called educated_familythat takes the value of 1 when either the
mother or the father has at least secondary education.4 We have also explored the possibility
of introducing parental education in several other manners (see the Online Appendix, Section
2The list of countries is: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
3For an overview of EU-SILC, see Wol¤ et al. (2010). To access further information about EUs regulations
concerning the SILC, data documentation provided by Eurostat, and SILC variable lists, we recommend the
EU-SILC web portal provided by the GESIS research institute at http://www.gesis.org/.
4The mean value of educated-family is .355 (st. dev. is .478). Requiring tertiary education would be too
restrictive, since only a 11.68% of individuals in the sample have at least one parent with tertiary education.
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A). As can be observed there, our main results do not depend on how parental education
is dened. In addition to parental education, we consider a set of household characteristics
when the individual was young (unemployed father, number of siblings, single mother family,
etc.).5 See Section F in the Online Appendix where we check the validity of our results to
alternative measures of childhood circumstances.
As we said above, we obtain data on public expenditure from the UNESCO Database for
Education. The UNESCO Database for Education contains country data on annual public
expenditure in education per student going back to 1971, although in some countries there
are missing data for some years. The original data correspond to percentages of per capita
GDP at three levels (primary, secondary, tertiary). We use data on per capita GDP to
recover data on expenditure in primary, secondary and tertiary education for each country
and year. We also use data on Purchasing Power Parities from the World Bank.6 Since data
on per capita GDP are in US dollars of year 2000, all our data on expenditure per individual
have the same purchasing power in terms of 2000 US dollars. Our data cover the period from
1971 to 2008, for which we have 608 distinct country-year cells.7
We propose di¤erent ways of measuring per child expenditure. We follow previous re-
search on the long-run impact of public expenditure on adult circumstances using di¤erent
combinations of per pupil public education expenditure as proxies of public expenditure.8
As we do not know whether they attended education in a di¤erent country, we exclude from
our sample all individuals who were not born in the country of residence at the time of the
survey
The rst measure we consider aggregates expenditure across the three educational levels
and takes the average of these expenditures for the country of residence when the child was of
ages 15 to 17. This allows us to study the e¤ect of public expenditure made before the age at
which individuals may join the labor market. We think of our measure as a proxy for general
public expenditure rather than a measure of public expenditure in education. As an example,
consider the case of an individual born in Spain in 1960, who was 16 in 1976. The sum of pub-
lic spending per capita at the three levels in Spain in 1976 was $3,558.57. The corresponding
5We do not use information on parents occupation, since these variables contain a large fraction of missing
values.
6See http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/default.aspx and http://data.worldbank.org/ for data
on public expenditure in education and PPP, respectively.
7Since our sample contains 16 countries, in principle we could have data for the three educational levels
corresponding to 16*38 = 608 distinct country-year cells. However, we lack data corresponding to 115 of
these cells. This can be due to the fact that UNESCO did not collect data every year in every country. We
use a simple linear interpolation to smooth expenditure data. We cannot do this when missing data for a
given country correspond to the rst or the last years of the period considered. As an example, data for
Belgium are only from 1975 onwards while for Spain they are from 1972.
8See Akin and Garnkel (1980), Grogger (1996), or Mayer and Lopoo (2008).
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numbers for 1975 (when 15) and 1977 (when 17) are $3,415.94 and $3,517.64, respectively.
We assign to this individual the average of these three numbers, namely $3,497.38. By doing
so, we get a smoother measure of expenditure than just considering expenditure at age 16
only, for instance. Our second measure is similar to the rst one, but adds only expenditure
for primary and secondary education. With this second measure, we try to capture expen-
diture at the compulsory levels of education, which could be a better measure of the level
of public spending from which all individuals have benetted. We also consider expenditure
separately at each one of the three levels. By doing this, we try to see which one of the three
components of government exhibits the strongest association with poverty reduction.
Observe that our measure of public expenditure is not the exact amount individuals
received while they attended primary, secondary or tertiary education. In that case, and
in particular regarding expenditure on tertiary education, the amount of public expenditure
assigned to each individual would depend on his (endogenous) decision of college attendance,
which is highly correlated with parental education (see, for example, Piopiunik, 2014 for
recent evidence on the causal link between parents and childrens education). Thus, by
constructing our measure in this way, we avoid introducing bias on the impact of public
expenditure on future poverty status. Since our oldest data on public spending go back to
1971, we have to restrict our sample to individuals born between 1954 and 1980 (for the 2005
cross section) and between 1954 and 1985 (for the 2011 cross section).9 This means that
the age range in our sample varies between 25 and 57. The reason to choose expenditure
when individuals were 15-17 is to have the largest possible sample size. An individual born
in 1954 was 17 in 1971, so we can assign to him/her some expenditure in that year. In
addition, Mayer and Lopoo (2008) use the same age interval. Nevertheless, we redo the
exercise considering public expenditure earlier in life. In particular, we choose expenditure
when the individual was aged 10-12. Now the earliest cohort would be that of 1959, which
implies we lose ve birth cohorts (1954-1958) with a sizable reduction in sample size (see
Table 5). Our results remain qualitatively the same, although, as we comment below, we
lose signicance in some models . Our nal sample consists of 163,159 individuals from 16
countries. Of those, 78,183 are in the 2005 wave and 85,021 in the 2011 wave.
Our objective is to study whether public expenditure helps to mitigate the e¤ects on
adult circumstances of being raised in a disadvantaged household. In particular, we focus
on individuals current poverty status.10 This is the information contained in the variable
9With our measure, for those born in 1954 we assign public spending in 1971 (they are 17 in 1971) only,
while for those born in 1955 we assign the average of public spending in 1971 and 1972 (they are 16 and 17,
respectively).
10In Online Appendix, Section F, we perfom some robustness checks to alternative denitions of monetary
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HX080, which is an indicator of whether the individual lives in a family with income below the
poverty threshold.11 We dene a dummy variable called poorwhich is 1 whenever HX080
is 1. This is a standard poverty measure and the o¢ cial one in the European Union.12 The
mean value of poor in our nal sample is 12.11%. It takes roughly the same value in both
waves. Figure 1 shows the percentage of individuals below the poverty line in each country.
Figure 1
The maximum value is found in Greece (18.6%) and the minimum in Denmark (3.6%).
The dotted line is the mean for the whole sample. It is important to remember that these
numbers are not representative of the whole population, since we are considering only those
individuals who at the time of the survey were 25-51 in the 2005 wave or 25-57 in the 2011
wave. In particular, the elderly are excluded from our sample. Table 1 shows the main
descriptive statistics. A complete description of all the variables we use can be found in the
Appendix.
Table 1
Table 2 below illustrates the correlation between current poverty status and family back-
ground, as measured by parental education. We compute probabilities for the current poverty
status (variable poor), conditional on the two possible values of the variable educated_family.
We also provide their corresponding standard errors. We do it separately for the two cross
sections and also pooling all the data. As Table 2 shows, there is a strong association between
these two variables.
poverty, in particular considering other income sources.
11The poverty line corresponds to 60% of equivalized household disposable income and corresponds to the
standard measure of poverty in the European Union. Equivalized household disposable income (HX090) is
equal to the product of total disposable household income (HY020), multiplied by an ination factor for
within-household non-response (HY025), divided by equivalized household size (HX050). That is, HX090 =
HY 020HY 025
HX050 :
12See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:At-risk-of-poverty_rate
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Table 2: Long-run e¤ects of parental education
Poor 2005 Poor 2011 Poor All
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
educated_family=0 15.04 0.16 15.37 0.16 15.21 0.11
educated_family=1 6.14 0.15 6.59 0.14 6.40 0.10
Di¤erence test p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
All 12.11 0.11 12.11 0.11 12.11 0.08
In the 2005 cross section (Column 1 in the table), the proportion of individuals who had
low-educated parents that are below the poverty line is 15.04%. However, for those individ-
uals with educated parents this probability is just 6.14%. We nd similar di¤erences in the
2011 cross section (15.37% vs. 6.59%) and with the two cross sections combined (15.21% vs.
6.40%). So, roughly speaking, the probability of being below the poverty line for individuals
with low-educated parents is twice as big as that of individuals with highly-educated par-
ents.13 We illustrate these correlations at the country level in the online Appendix, Section
B.
Finally, we briey describe the connection at the country level between expenditure and
poverty by family type. In order to do so, we compute poverty rates according to the
education of parents for each country. We use the average value of one of our measures of
spending per individual (in logs), in particular our rst measure of public expenditure that
aggregates expenditure across the three educational levels (primary, secondary and tertiary)
for the country of residence when the child was of ages 15 to 17. As we have already seen
in Table 2, poverty rates are typically higher among individuals with low-educated parents.
Figure 2 shows poverty rates for these two groups as a function of average public expenditure.
We t a line for each group. We see that higher expenditure is associated with lower poverty
rates mostly for individuals whose parents have a low education level.14
Figure 2
Next, we analyze whether these relationships observed at the country level hold also at
the individual level.
13The t-statistics for the di¤erence in mean poverty between individuals without educated parents and
with educated parents are equal to 35.96, 41.13 and 54.54 for the 2005, 2011 and the all sample respectively.
14The slope of the line corresponding to individuals with parents with low education is -.085 (p-value
0.004), while the one corresponding to individuals with highly educated parents is -.013 (p-value 0.228).
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3 Empirical model
Our aim is to study the e¤ect that public expenditure has on reducing the long-run negative
e¤ects of having a disadvantaged background. The relationship of interest between public
expenditure and poverty status is given by the following equation:
POORi = 0+1PEct+2ED_FAMi+3(PEctED_FAMi)+Xi+c+t+ "i; (1)
where POORi is an indicator that equals 1 if individual i lives in a household that has
disposable income below the poverty line. The variable PEct is the logarithm of our measure
of public spending per capita corresponding to an individual from country c born in year t.15
We try di¤erent measures of public spending, as described above. The variable ED_FAMi is
a dummy variable capturing parental education. We add an interaction term of this dummy
variable with public expenditure to test whether individuals who grew up in families in which
both parents had little education benet di¤erently from public expenditure, compared to
other individuals. We include country xed e¤ects in the model, captured by the term c
which contains a set of dummy variables, to control for invariant factors within countries.
We include a time trend, captured by the parameter t that represents a vector of birth year
variables. In particular, it addresses a possible common time trend toward increasing public
expenditure. Because of the structure of our data, we cannot include country-specic time
trends since these ones would be perfectly correlated with our measures of public expenditure.
Recall that we assign the same value of expenditure to all individuals who were born in the
same year and country. However, below we include two additional regressors that help to
capture country-specic time trends.
The vector Xi contains the remaining explanatory variables, apart from parentseduca-
tion. First, there are variables describing current circumstances (gender, non-citizen status,
date of survey). Second, we include a set of family background variables that were determined
well before schooling was completed. We include number of siblings, having been raised in
a single-mother family and whether the father was unemployed at that time. Third, we add
some country-cohort specic variables. In particular, we control for per capita GDP at the
time the individual benetted from each particular measure of PE. By doing so, we relate
15We could alternatively consider the ratio of expenditure over GDP as our main regressor of interest (see
Hidalgo-Hidalgo and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2013) for a similar strategy). However, we choose our approach for
two reasons. First, it is a more general specication (observe that using the ratio implies restricting the e¤ect
of ln(GDP ) to be the mirror e¤ect of ln(PE)). Second, it provides a more clear interpretation of results
(since a large value in this ratio can be due either to high spending or to low per head GDP). Nevertheless
we have also estimated a model using the ratio and nd results in line with the ones in the paper. We do
not show these results here for space reasons but are available upon request.
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education expenditure to the level of living of the country. If we did not do this, the impact of
expenditure on education might be biased. Rich countries raise more revenue from taxes and
can dedicate more resources to education. At the same time, they have lower poverty rates.
Then, the impact of public expenditure in education would be overestimated. In particular,
we add a variable called GDPct that represents the logarithm of average per capita GDP
when the individual was of age 15 to 17. Not surprisingly, the two variables PE and GDP
are strongly correlated.16
Fourth, we also include a measure of initial inequality(denoted by INEQct). The idea
is that countries with larger amounts of public expenditure may have unobserved character-
istics (for instance, inequality levels) that correlate with both those levels of spending and
current individual poverty status. If these inequality levels are positively correlated with
current individual poverty, then our results would be overestimating the true impact of pub-
lic spending (as measured here). For example, more unequal countries may spend more on
other long term inequality-reduction policies (not captured in the measured proposed in the
paper) which reduces individualsprobability of being poor when adults. However, these
inequality levels might also be negatively correlated with individualscurrent poverty status.
For example, if some forms of expenditure are entitlements, those countries that are initially
more unequal might need to spend more than countries with fewer poor families. In that
case, our results would be underestimating the true impact of public spending on poverty
reduction. Thus, it is very di¢ cult to establish a priory the sign and magnitude of the bias if
we do not account for this e¤ect.17 Similarly to the case of GDP; we assign to each individual
the average value of the Gini indexes in her country at the time she benetted from each
particular measure of PE. Note that both GDPct and INEQct take a di¤erent value for
every combination of year of birth and country. They reect initial circumstances that may
have a long-run e¤ect later in life.18
The crucial issue for identication is the assumption regarding exogeneity of public expen-
diture. Variation in this measure arises because of di¤erences in expenditure across countries
at the same point in time and di¤erences in country expenditure over time. Either di¤erence
could be partly endogenous with respect to the poverty rate and related to both country
16The correlation coe¢ cient is 0.66 when we consider our rst measure of expenditure per capita, the one
that adds expenditure at the three levels.
17There is some evidence in the related literature on that. For example, Sylwester (2000), in a cross-
country analysis nds that higher levels of initial income inequality are associated with higher public education
expenditure. See also, Corak (2006) or Marx et al (2014) for additional discussion on the relationship between
inequality and social policies.
18In the online Appendix, Section F, we check whether public expenditure has a similar impact on poverty
reduction regardless of some contextual variables as country GDP or inequality. Results are very similar to
the ones found for the main specication.
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expenditure and childrens eventual income. The inclusion of GDP and INEQ as regressors
helps to partially correct this endogeneity problem. However, there are many other factors
that may have changed within particular countries between the time the individual was a
teenager and the time of the survey. The inclusion of a time trend can capture a common
trend, but cannot capture di¤erences across countries over time. To address this problem
we include two additional regressors that help to control for country-specic trends. These
are the change in per capita GDP and the change in our measure of inequality from the
time the individual was 15-17 until the year of survey response, respectively. Since we have
two cross sections, these two regressors take di¤erent values for each combination of year
of birth, country, and cross section. They control for possible changes that are happening
within countries between the moment when expenditure was made and the moment when
poverty status is determined.19
Another concern is that the place in which people end up living may also play a role in
determining poverty status (at least in the US there is wide variation in rates intergenerational
mobility across regions within counties, see Chetty et al., 2014) and therefore we include some
region-cohort-specic controls. In particular, we include as controls both the unemployment
level in the region of residence when the individual was 15-17, together with the change in
the unemployment level between that time and the year of survey response. We decided not
to do so in our main specication because there are many missing data in the unemployment
variable. In fact, sample size reduces by almost one half. In Section 4, we comment on this.
Finally, since we combine individual-level data with group-level data in our explanatory
variable of interest (PEct), errors are clustered at the country and year of birth level. Since
our dependent variable is a binary variable, we also estimate a probit model and obtain similar
results. Thus, for the sake of brevity, we only report results from the OLS specication in
the main text.20
Note that, according to the specication in Equation (1), if public expenditure during
teen years reduces the probability of being poor as an adult, the estimated coe¢ cient of 1
should be negative. Moreover, if that e¤ect works mainly through those individuals who
come from families with a low level of education, the estimated coe¢ cient of 3 should be
positive.
19An additional way to account for unobserved factors consists of interacting the cohort trends with the
initial GDP and Inequality to allow separate trends for countries that have initially low or high productivity
and inequality. We considered this possibility and obtained very similar qualitative results. See online
Appendix, Section C.
20We show the results of estimating Equation (1) with a Probit specication (see online Appendix, Section
D).
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4 Results
We begin by estimating seven alternative models using the di¤erent measures of public expen-
diture per capita presented in Section 2. In Model 1, we use the sum of public expenditure at
the three educational levels. In Model 2, we only add expenditure in primary and secondary
education. Models 3 to 5 consider only expenditure on primary, secondary, and tertiary
education, respectively. In Model 6, we include expenditure on primary and secondary edu-
cation, included separately. Finally, in Model 7 we include expenditure at the three levels,
again separately. In the seven models, each spending category is interacted with the dummy
variable ED_FAMi. All seven models include the full set of controls, with the exception
of the rate of unemployment and its change. Later on, we include these additional controls
to see if they a¤ect our results. Since we want to concentrate on the e¤ects of our main
variables of interest, we present in Tables 3 and 4 the marginal e¤ects corresponding to the
di¤erent measures of government spending and to the dummy variable that describes the
level of education in the family (ED_FAMi).21 Table 3 calculates the overall e¤ects of
these variables, while in Table 4 we compute marginal e¤ects of government expenditure, for
each one of the two family types.22 Recall that the estimation we get for the parameter 1
captures the e¤ect of PE on individuals from families with a low level of education, while
the e¤ect on those coming from families with a high education level is captured by the sum
1+ 3. The overall marginal e¤ect is simply a weighted sum of these two e¤ects, where the
weights correspond to the fraction of individuals in each group.
Table 3
The upper part of Table 3 shows a pattern that is consistent with the idea that higher pub-
lic expenditure on primary and on secondary education is associated with lower poverty rates
in adulthood. This association vanishes when we consider expenditure on tertiary education.
The estimated marginal e¤ects of total expenditure (Model 1), expenditure on compulsory
education (Model 2), on primary education (Model 3), and on secondary education (Model
4) are all negative and signicant at the 1% level except for total expenditure, which is
signicant only at the 5% level. The marginal e¤ect of expenditure on tertiary education
(Model 5) is not statistically di¤erent from zero. When we include separately expenditure at
di¤erent levels (Models 6 and 7), we nd that higher expenditure on primary and secondary
21Results remain unchanged after excluding observations with number of siblings above 19 and observations
with youth unemployment rate above 75 (see Table 1). Results available upon request.
22In Section E of the online Appendix we present a table with the estimated coe¢ cients corresponding to
Models 1 to 7.
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education is again associated with lower adult poverty rates. Interestingly, in Model 7 we nd
that more expenditure on tertiary education is associated with a higher incidence of adult
poverty. A possible explanation could be that expenditure on primary and, in particular,
secondary education helps to redistribute income. Notice that this is a type of expenditure
that benets most individuals, since attendance at these levels is compulsory in most coun-
tries. On the contrary, since attendance in tertiary education is not compulsory, expenditure
at this level concentrates on the richest segment of the society. Another explanation could
be that, since public expenditure is computed when individuals are in their teens, they are
most likely to be a¤ected by expenditure on secondary education since this is the level of
education they are currently attending.
To illustrate the size of the e¤ects we obtain, we focus on Model 4 in which we only
consider expenditure on secondary education. The estimated marginal e¤ect is  :0158: This
means that an increase of one standard deviation ($1,556) in expenditure is associated with a
reduction of 0.61 percentage points in adult poverty. This is a sizable e¤ect, since it represents
a 5% of the mean value of the variable poor (the mean of poor is 0.1211). Nevertheless, this
e¤ect is dwarfed by the e¤ect of having educated parents. In Model 4, we nd that having
educated parents is associated with a reduction of 6.75 percentage points in the probability
of being poor, in line with what we saw in Table 2.23
In the bottom part of Table 3, we add two additional regressors. These are the level of
unemployment in the region of residence when the individual was 16, together with the change
in the unemployment rate since that moment till of survey response. These unemployment
rates are computed from the European Labor Force Survey.24 Data on unemployment rates
are not available for all the country-cohorts we have in our sample. Because of this, using
unemployment rates reduces our sample size from 140,053 to 84,121 observations in the case
of Model 4. This means that the results are not directly comparable to those on the upper
part of the table. In particular, we lose more than 50% of the observations from Austria,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden. In terms of cohorts, we lose all observations
from 1954 to 1957. In general, the inclusion of the unemployment rate means that we give
more weight to younger cohorts. In any case, we nd that the results are very much in
line with those in the upper part of the table. In particular, the e¤ect of expenditure on
secondary education is even stronger than what we obtained in the upper part of the table.
23Results are also similar if we use alternative denitions of parental education. In Section A of the online
Appendix we examine results by including instead separately two variables capturing both father and mother
educational levels and also by dening three category dummies to capture three levels of educated parents
instead of just two. We nd very similar results.
24See the Eurostat website for an overview of the LFS:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey
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We also nd that now expenditure on primary education does not seem to be associated with
a reduction in poverty rates.
Table 4
Since the models we estimate contain an interaction term between expenditure and family
type, this allows us to compute marginal e¤ects separately according to family type. This is
what Table 4 shows, for the baseline model that does not include unemployment rates. In
the upper part of the table, we present the results corresponding to Models 1-5. Below, we
present the results corresponding to models 6 and 7. The general pattern is that the e¤ect
that public expenditure has on reducing adult poverty concentrates mostly on individuals
from families with low education. In models 1-6, we nd that the e¤ect of expenditure
is associated with a reduction in poverty rates only for individuals with parents with low
education. For instance, an increase in expenditure on secondary education of the size of one
standard deviation is associated with a reduction of between 1.18 and 1.25 percentage points
in the incidence of poverty in adulthood for children from low-educated families depending
on the particular model considered.
It is very interesting what happens in Model 5. The marginal e¤ect for individuals from
non-educated families is negative and highly signicant (-0.0142), while the one corresponding
to individuals from educated families is positive and also highly signicant (+0.0344). These
two e¤ects do not have similar sizes but do have opposite signs. This is the reason why
in Table 3 we found no e¤ect of public expenditure on poverty reduction, since the overall
marginal e¤ect we obtained (+0.0034) is just the weighted average of the two marginal e¤ects
in Table 4.25 In Model 7, we get mixed results. Similar to Models 4 and 6, expenditure in
secondary education has a stronger association with poverty reduction for individuals from
low educated families than for individuals from educated families. Expenditure in primary
education seems to have a stronger e¤ect on individuals from educated families, in opposition
to results in Models 3 and 6.
Finally, expenditure on tertiary education in Model 7 follows a similar pattern to what
happens in Model 5. Once we disaggregate by family type, its correlation with poverty sta-
tus is negative for individuals from non-educated families and positive for the other group.
Focusing again on Model 4, an increase of one standard deviation in expenditure in sec-
ondary education is associated with a reduction of 1.24 percentage points in adult poverty
for individuals from families with low education.
25The weights are the proportion of individuals from educated and non-educated families, in particular
0.3636 and 0.6364, for the observations used in the estimation of Model 5.
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The general conclusion from Tables 3 and 4 is that higher public expenditure seems to
be associated with lower adult poverty rates, although the e¤ect seems to work through
expenditure in primary and, in particular, secondary education. This nding is in line with
previous results in the literature (see Mayer, 2002 or Mayer and Lopoo, 2008).26
Next we estimate again all Models 1-7, but using expenditure when individuals were of
ages 10 to 12. We do this to study whether the strong e¤ect of expenditure on secondary
education found in Tables 3 and 4 is due to the fact that most individuals aged 15-17 must be
enrolled in secondary education. If that is the main reason, when using expenditure at ages
10-12 we should nd a stronger e¤ect of expenditure in primary education, since that is the
level in which most individuals should be enrolled at that age. As we said above, results are
not exactly comparable for two reasons. First, with this new measure of expenditure, we have
fewer observations since now we lose all individuals born before 1959, while with our previous
measures we had cohorts going back to 1954. In the case of Model 4, sample size drops from
140,053 to 110,152. Second, the sample we use with this new measure is much younger since
we are excluding the ve older cohorts. As Table 5 shows, expenditure on secondary education
is still the one that has the strongest association with poverty reduction. Expenditure at the
other levels does not display any correlation with poverty reduction.27
Table 5
As a further illustration, we have used our results from Model 1 to compute predicted
probabilities of being below the poverty line as a function of public expenditure for the two
types of families. In particular, here we use our rst measure of public expenditure, the one
that combines expenditure at the three educational levels when individuals were of age 15-17
(Model 1). Figure 3 contains a plot of these probabilities. As can be seen in the gure, public
expenditure seems to reduce the gap between the two types of families. However, even at
the 99th percentile of total expenditure, there is still a gap between the probabilities for the
26As a robustness check, we regress poverty rates in adulthood on public expenditure from a di¤erent
period than the one we are considering in our main specication. In particular, to each cohort from a given
country, we randomly assign public expenditure corresponding to a di¤erent cohort from the same country.
We nd that the e¤ect of public expenditure is not signicant in most cases. Therefore, the actual measures of
public expenditure are meaningful determinants of the variation of current poverty rates among individuals.
See online Appendix, Section F.
27Similar results are obtained while estimating Models 1-7 using expenditure at age 10-12 and age 15-17
on the same smaller set of observations. These results are not shown for conciseness but available from the
authors upon request.
17
two groups.28
Figure 3
We see that the e¤ect of public expenditure on poverty is negative among individuals from
low educated families and positive among individuals with high educated parents. There-
fore we can conclude that the negative relationship between public expenditure and poverty
observed at the country level for individuals with parents with low education (see Figure 2
above) still holds at the individual level.
Before closing this section, we want to comment briey on the possible mechanisms behind
the e¤ect of public expenditure in adult poverty. There is a recent literature that points
to the existence of a positive link between public expenditure on education and academic
achievements. One possibility is that when we invest more resources in education, some
individuals benet because they acquire more education. In particular, they may decide
not to drop out of school after nishing compulsory education. This, in turn, may reduce
the probability of being below the poverty line when adults. Some recent studies provide
evidence on the potential mechanisms from which these spending e¤ects arise. For instance,
Bhalotra et al. (2015) nd that the removal of primary schools fees in developing countries is
associated with roughly 0.2 more years of schooling. They also nd that this e¤ect is stronger
for children of women with less schooling. Bellani and Bia (2016) use data from the 2005
and 2011 EU-SILC and nd that exposure to poverty in childhood reduces the probability
of completing at least secondary education by 12 percentage points. Finally, Jackson et al.
(2016) nd that spending increases are associated with sizable improvements in measured
school inputs, including reductions in student teacher ratios, increases in teacher salaries,
and longer school years, which in turn improve individualsadult outcomes.
5 Concluding remarks
Being raised in a poor household may have negative long-run e¤ects on individual welfare.
Here we study whether and to what extent these long-run e¤ects of poverty are mitigated by
public expenditure.
Our main nding is that public expenditure has a strong long-run e¤ect on reducing the
incidence of poverty in adulthood. In addition, we nd that this e¤ect concentrates mostly
on individuals who were raised in families with a low level of education. This result suggests
28Predicted probabilities of poor at the 99 percentile of public expenditure are .085 for individuals from
educated families and .113 for the other group. We reject the hypothesis that these two probabilities are
equal (p-value is 0.0001).
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that public expenditure increases intergenerational income mobility.
We believe that our results could be relevant for several recent debates in the literature
on the economics of education. In particular, they lend support to policies that promote
increasing expenditure on basic education, for example, by reducing the compulsory school
entry age, or by improving the quality of the education provided at early stages.
This study have several limitations. The most important one is the lack of a source of
plausibly exogenous variation in public expenditure, implying that the estimated coe¢ cients
may reect the e¤ects of other unobserved factors correlated both with expenditure and
with adult poverty status. The inclusion of several controls that capture country-specic
time trends may help to mitigate this concern. Another relatively minor concern is that
we do not have a direct measure of government investment in education and thus we follow
previous research in using government spending as a proxy for government investment (see
Mayer and Lopoo, 2008). However, public expenditure could be an imperfect measure of
actual investment. For example, countries that spend similar amounts might be spending
it di¤erently and having di¤erent results with the same level of expenditure depending on
several other circumstances. Moreover, we lack data on private expenditure on education,
although some of the variables describing household characteristics can be seen as proxies of
such expenditure.
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Appendix: Variable Description
 Expenditure per student, primary, secondary and tertiary: Public expenditure per stu-
dent is the public current spending on education divided by the total number of students
at that level. Public expenditure (current and capital) includes government spending
on educational institutions (both public and private), education administration as well
as subsidies for private entities (students/households and other privates entities). Data
are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, and are corrected by PPP. Sources: United Nations
Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics
and PPP data are from the World Bank.
 GDP per capita: It is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP
is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars
and are corrected by PPP. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data les.
 Educated family: A dummy variable that takes value 1 if either the education the father
or mother had attained when the individual was around 14 years old is at least upper
secondary education. Source: EU-SILC
 Father unemployed : A dummy variable that takes value 1 if the father was unemployed
when the individual was 14 years old. Source: EU-SILC.
 Siblings: It is the number of siblings the individuals had when he/she was around 14
years old. Source: EU-SILC.
 Citizenship: It generally corresponds to the country issuing the passport. It refers to
current (at the time of survey) national boundaries. It is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if citizenship corresponds to the country of residence. Source: EU-SILC
 Inequality: It is the country average inequality during the previous years (3-5) to the
period of individuals primary school attendance. Source: Estimated Household Income
Inequality Data Set (EHII), which is a panel of estimated Gini coe¢ cients. The EHII
is a global dataset on inequality derived by the University of Texas Inequality Project
(UTIP)
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 Unemployment rate: It is the regional (at the level of NUTS-2) youth unemployment
rate in the region of residence when the individual was 15-17. Source: EU Labor Force
Survey, Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons.
 Single mother : It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual lived with
only his mother when he/she was around 14 years old. Source: EU-SILC.
 CS2011 : It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation belongs to the
2011 cross section. Source: EU-SILC.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
      
Variable  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Poor 0.121 0.326 0 1 163,133 
Female 0.508 0.500 0 1 163,159 
Non citizen  0.00349 0.0590 0 1 162,915 
Year 2011 0.521 0.500 0 1 163,159 
Educated family  0.355 0.478 0 1 153,517 
Single mother family 0.0765 0.266 0 1 157,600 
Number of sib lings  1.791 1.687 0 40 155,908 
Father unemployed 0.00918 0.0954 0 1 147,536 
Per pupil exp. education (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 13,034.6 6,336.4 3,905.5 39,648.3 163,159 
Per pupil exp. compulsory education (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 6,039.3 2,613.2 1,246.6 17,710.6 163,159 
Per pupil exp. primary education (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 2,742.0 1,422.1 441.5 9,034.6 163,159 
Per pupil exp. secondary education (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 3,297.3 1,555.8 604.9 10,517.8 163,159 
Per pupil exp. tertiary education (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 6,995.3 4,492.6 1,857.4 31,475.1 163,159 
Per capita GDP (age 15-17), year 2000 US dollars (PPP) 16,324.5 3,971.4 5,742.1 35,686.7 163,159 
Income Inequality (age 15-17) 35.94 3.428 27.59 43,49 158,489 
Youth unemployment rate (age 16-21) 32.82 19.27 0 92,03 102,476 
Country dummies 
     AT 
    
8,828 
BE 
    
7,051 
DK 
    
3,387 
ES 
    
23,637 
FI 
    
8,106 
FR 
    
15,862 
GR 
    
9,581 
HU 
    
4,781 
IE 
    
7,008 
IT 
    
32,769 
LU 
    
3,265 
NL 
    
9,083 
NO 
    
4,363 
PT 
    
7,820 
SE 
    
4,660 
UK 
    
12,958 
          163,159 
Note: Sample: Ind ividuals for which the variable Per pupil expenditure in education is not missing. Source: EU-SILC 2005 and 
2011 and UNESCO Database. 
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Table 3: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure (15-17 years old) 
        
                
I. Baseline Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0128** 
      
 
(0.0065) 
      Exp. in compulsory educ  
 
-0.0322*** 
     
  
(0.0073) 
     Exp. in primary educ 
  
-0.0139*** 
  
-0.0126** -0.0157*** 
   
(0.0053) 
  
(0.0054) (0.0057) 
Exp. in secondary educ  
   
-0.0158*** 
 
-0.0159*** -0.0204*** 
    
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0040) (0.0042) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0034 
 
0.0096** 
     
(0.0046) 
 
(0.0048) 
Family educated -0.0688*** -0.0684*** -0.0657*** -0.0688*** -0.0675*** -0.0687*** -0.0694*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
        
        II. Adding unemployment and its change 
                     
Total exp.  -0.0185 
      
 
(0.0114) 
      Exp. in compulsory educ  
 
-0.0399*** 
     
  
(0.0091) 
     Exp. in primary educ  
  
-0.0126 
  
-0.0062 -0.0156 
   
(0.0102) 
  
(0.0083) (0.0094) 
Exp. in secondary  
   
-0.0250*** 
 
-0.0238*** -0.0288*** 
    
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0047) (0.0050) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0039 
 
0.0197** 
     
(0.0103) 
 
(0.0090) 
Family educated -0.0732*** -0.0729*** -0.0711*** -0.0739*** -0.0724*** -0.0740*** -0.0745*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
        Observations  82,580 83,875 83,875 84,121 82,826 83,875 82,580 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year of birth level. Source: EU-SILC 2005 and 
201, UNESCO Database and EU Labor Force Survey, Eurostat (see the Appendix for the variables definition). 
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Table 4: Decomposition of the marginal effect of public expenditure (15-17 
years old) 
                  
I. Baseline Models 1-5 Total Compulsory Primary Secondary Tertiary 
            
Educated family = 0  -0.0347*** -0.0510*** -0.0281*** -0.0322*** -0.0142*** 
 
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0048) 
      Educated family = 1  0.0255*** 0.0002 0.0103* 0.0126** 0.0344*** 
 
(0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0053) 
      Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 
      
      II. Baseline Model 6  
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0135** -0.0316*** 
 
   
(0.0066) (0.0045) 
 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0111*  0.0114* 
 
   
(0.0065) (0.0061) 
 
      Observations    139,807 139,807  
      
      III. Baseline Model 7 
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0144** -0.0303*** -0.0021 
   
(0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0050) 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0181*** -0.0031 0.0300*** 
   
(0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0065) 
      Observations      138,512 138,512 138,512 
Note: Sample: Indiv iduals for which the variable Per pupil expenditure in education is not missing. 
Source: EU-SILC 2005 and 2011 and UNESCO Database. 
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Table 5: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure (10-12 years old) 
  
  
              
I. Baseline Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  
              
Total exp.  0.0050 
       (0.0074) 
      Exp. in compulsory educ  
  
-0.0085 
     
 
(0.0101) 
     Exp. in primary educ  
   
0.0103 
  
0.0146** 0.0115 
  
(0.0072) 
  
(0.0073) (0.0079) 
Exp. in secondary educ  
    
-0.0232*** 
 
-0.0232*** -0.0266*** 
   
(0.0057) 
 
(0.0055) (0.0058) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0061 
 
0.0086 
    
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0057) 
Family educated -0.0710*** -0.0711*** -0.0679*** -0.0717*** -0.0694*** -0.0717*** -0.0720*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
 
       Observations 
109,560 110,152 111,901 110,152 115,218 110,152 109,560 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. Source: EU-SILC 2005 and 
2011 and UNESCO Database (see the Appendix for the variables definition).  
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Notes: Only individuals between ages 25 and 57. We exclude individuals not born in the corresponding 
country. Source: EU-SILC, waves 2005 and 2011. 
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AT
BE
DK
ES
FI
FR
GR HU
IE
IT
LU
NL
NO
PT
SE
UK
AT
BE
DK
ES FI
FR
GR HU
IE
IT
LU
NLNOPT
SE
UK
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
b
e
lo
w
 p
o
v
e
rt
y
 r
a
te
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Public expenditure in 2000 dollars PPP (in logs)
Non-educated parents Educated parents
Figure 2: Public expenditure and poverty rates
by parental background
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3 3.25 3.5
Total public expenditure (logs)
educated_family=0 educated_family=1
Figure 3: Predicted effect of PE on poverty by family background
1 
 
Online appendix to  
Long-run Effects of Public Expenditure on Poverty 
Marisa Hidalgo-Hidalgo and Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe 
  
A. Parental education  
 
In this section we explore whether our results are sensitive to the definition of parental 
education. First we present the results of estimating the model in Equation (1) introducing 
separately the educational levels of both parents. 
Table 1A: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure: father and mother education 
        
                
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0154** 
      
 
(0.0066) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0332*** 
     
  
(0.0075) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0136** 
  
-0.0118** -0.0143** 
   
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0056) (0.0059) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0170*** 
 
-0.0170*** -0.0209*** 
    
(0.0042) 
 
(0.0041) (0.0044) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0016 
 
0.0076 
     
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0051) 
Father educated -0.0501*** -0.0496*** -0.0484*** -0.0490*** -0.0497*** -0.0495*** -0.0504*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
Mother educated -0.0380*** -0.0378*** -0.0351*** -0.0384*** -0.0361*** -0.0379*** -0.0384*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
        Observations  131,167 132,423 134,083 132,654 136,717 132,423 131,167 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. 
 
As can be observed, the effect of father’s education on poverty reduction is somewhat 
larger than that of mother’s education. The results regarding the impact of public expenditure 
are very similar to the ones shown in Table 3, although the sample size gets lower because of 
the large increase in missing values. Observe that our dummy variable "educated_family" 
categorizes as non-educated family those with 1 "non-missing" parent without secondary 
education and 1 "missing" parent with secondary education. Note that this definition might 
increase measurement error. However, it does not threaten the main findings. Observe that this 
measurement error would likely introduce a positive bias on the negative impact of public 
expenditure on poverty: some individuals with educated family, for which public expenditure 
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has no effect, are pooled with individuals from non-educated families. Thus, if we could 
separate them the effect of public expenditure would be larger. 
Next we define parental education through three dummies that will be equal to 1 if either 
the mother or the father has primary, secondary or tertiary education, respectively. We estimated 
Equation (1) using this alternative definition. Table 2D shows the results for this definition of 
parental education (Models 1-7):  
 
Table 2A: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure: educated family (three categories) 
        
                
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0132** 
      
 
(0.0065) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0329*** 
     
  
(0.0073) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0140*** 
  
-0.0131** -0.0161*** 
   
(0.0053) 
  
(0.0054) (0.0058) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0159*** 
 
-0.0161*** -0.0207*** 
    
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0040) (0.0043) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0033 
 
0.0097** 
     
(0.0046) 
 
(0.0048) 
Family educated (Sec Educ) -0.0557*** -0.0545*** -0.0519*** -0.0550*** -0.0545*** -0.0547*** -0.0558*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Family educated (Ter Educ) -0.0549*** -0.0555*** -0.0542*** -0.0542*** -0.0537*** -0.0554*** -0.0558*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. 
 
 
Again, results are very similar to the ones in Table (3) in the paper. Thus, the impact of 
public expenditure on current poverty status does not depend on how parental education is 
defined.  
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B. Poverty and parental education 
 
 
In this Section we provide a brief description of the correlation between current poverty status 
and family background, as measured by parental education.  We illustrate these correlations in 
Figure 1A below, where we represent poverty rates by country for individuals with educated 
and non-educated parents, respectively.  
 
Notes: Educated parents means that at least one of them has secondary or tertiary education. Source: EU-
SILC, 2005 and 2011. 
We find striking differences across countries. While the general pattern is that poverty 
rates are higher among those who have non-educated parents, the Scandinavian countries follow 
a different pattern. In both Denmark and Norway we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
difference in poverty rates between individuals with educated and non-educated parents is zero. 
Moreover, in Sweden poverty rates are higher for individuals from educated families than for 
those from non-educated families, and this difference is significatively different from zero. In 
all remaining countries poverty rates are significantly higher among those who have non-
educated parents. Another clear pattern is that differences in poverty rates according to parental 
education are much higher in those countries where the poverty rate is high. 
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Figure 1B: Poverty status by parental education
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C. Separate trends for countries  
 
In Section 4 we present estimation results of Equation (1) where we include initial GDP and 
Inequality for each country-cohort and the changes in both the per capita GDP and Inequality 
between the time the individual was 15-17 until the year of the survey response. They control 
for possible changes that are happening within countries between the moment when the 
expenditure was made and the moment when the poverty status is determined. An additional 
way to account for unobserved factors consists of interacting the cohort trends with the initial 
GDP and the initial Inequality to allow separate trends for countries that have initially low or 
high productivity and inequality. We considered this possibility and obtained very similar 
qualitative results:  
 
 
Table 1C: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure:  
GDP and Ineq interacted with time trends 
        
                
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0070 
      
 
(0.0059) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0321*** 
     
  
(0.0071) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0113** 
  
-0.0117** -0.0131** 
   
(0.0047) 
  
(0.0049) (0.0056) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0163*** 
 
-0.0161*** -0.0147*** 
    
(0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) (0.0046) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0043 
 
0.0089* 
     
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0051) 
Family educated -0.0686*** -0.0682*** -0.0656*** -0.0685*** -0.0674*** -0.0685*** -0.0690*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level.  
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D. Probit estimation results  
 
Table 1D: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure. Probit (age 15-17) 
        
                
I. Baseline Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0108*  
      
 
(0.0061) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0312*** 
     
  
(0.0071) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0154*** 
  
-0.0131** -0.0187*** 
   
(0.0054) 
  
(0.0053) (0.0061) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0146*** 
 
-0.0146*** -0.0198*** 
    
(0.0042) 
 
(0.0041) (0.0043) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0041 
 
0.0127*** 
     
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0049) 
Family educated -0.0700*** -0.0694*** -0.0674*** -0.0696*** -0.0691*** -0.0696*** -0.0703*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
        
        II. Adding unemployment and its change  
                      
Total exp.  -0.0177 
      
 
(0.0110) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0422*** 
     
  
(0.0094) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0164 
  
-0.0112 -0.0275** 
   
(0.0105) 
  
(0.0089) (0.0107) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0248*** 
 
-0.0233*** -0.0299*** 
    
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0049) (0.0052) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0052 
 
0.0268*** 
     
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0092) 
Family educated -0.0738*** -0.0736*** -0.0723*** -0.0742*** -0.0732*** -0.0743*** -0.0746*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
        Observations  82,580 83,875 83,875 84,121 82,826 83,875 82,580 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. 
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Table 2D: Decomposition of the marginal effect of public expenditure. Probit 
      
            
I. Models 1-5 Total Compulsory Primary Secondary Tertiary 
            
Educated family = 0  -0.0277*** -0.0492*** -0.0275*** -0.0282*** -0.0070 
 
(0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0068) (0.0048) (0.0051) 
      Educated family = 1  0.0189*** 0.0001 0.0053 0.0088** 0.0239*** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0037) 
      Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 
      
      II. Model 6 
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0152** -0.0285*** 
 
   
(0.0071) (0.0050) 
 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0096** 0.0093** 
 
   
(0.0048) (0.0047) 
 
      Observations      139,807 139,807   
      
      III. Model 7  
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0207** -0.0302*** 0.0066 
   
(0.0080) (0.0053) (0.0059) 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0151*** -0.0018 0.0233*** 
   
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0045) 
      Observations      138,512 138,512 138,512 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. 
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E. Baseline model. Coefficients OLS 
 
Table 1E: Baseline models: coefficients OLS (age 15-17) 
                        
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0347*** 
      
 
(0.0066) 
      Family educated#Total exp. 0.0601*** 
      
 
(0.0048) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0510*** 
     
 
(0.0076) 
     Family educated#Exp. in compulsory education 
 
0.0513*** 
     
  
(0.0056) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0281*** 
  
-0.0135** -0.0144** 
  
(0.0059) 
  
(0.0066) (0.0069) 
Family educated#Exp. in primary education 
  
0.0384*** 
  
0.0025 -0.0037 
   
(0.0054) 
  
(0.0079) (0.0082) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0322*** 
 
-0.0316*** -0.0303*** 
   
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0045) (0.0047) 
Family educated#Exp. in secondary education 
   
0.0448*** 
 
0.0431*** 0.0273*** 
    
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0067) (0.0087) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
-0.0142*** 
 
-0.0021 
    
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0050) 
Family educated#Exp. in tertiary education 
    
0.0485*** 
 
0.0321*** 
     
(0.0039) 
 
(0.0058) 
Family educated -0.2157*** -0.1552*** -0.1005*** -0.1158*** -0.1535*** -0.1161*** -0.1514*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0103) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0079) (0.0063) (0.0081) 
Female 0.0124*** 0.0123*** 0.0122*** 0.0124*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0124*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Non citizen 0.0780*** 0.0617*** 0.0602*** 0.0598*** 0.0741*** 0.0612*** 0.0787*** 
 
(0.0204) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0202) (0.0181) (0.0204) 
Single mother family 0.0306*** 0.0297*** 0.0304*** 0.0295*** 0.0313*** 0.0295*** 0.0306*** 
 
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
Number of siblings 0.0174*** 0.0173*** 0.0172*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Father unemployed 0.1502*** 0.1510*** 0.1506*** 0.1516*** 0.1470*** 0.1512*** 0.1500*** 
 
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
(log)GDP 0.0338 0.0309 0.0336 0.0211 0.0271 0.0274 0.0442 
 
(0.0744) (0.0736) (0.0732) (0.0734) (0.0738) (0.0734) (0.0740) 
GDP growth -0.0106 -0.0022 0.0103 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0028 0.0013 
 
(0.0729) (0.0727) (0.0723) (0.0726) (0.0727) (0.0726) (0.0729) 
Income Inequality  -0.0062 -0.0075*  -0.0086*  -0.0073 -0.0093** -0.0071 -0.0090*  
 
(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0048) 
Change in Income Inequality -0.1171 -0.1113 -0.1758 -0.1122 -0.2351*  -0.0964 -0.1838 
 
(0.1446) (0.1365) (0.1332) (0.1362) (0.1385) (0.1373) (0.1469) 
cs2011 0.0109** 0.0119** 0.0130*** 0.0119** 0.0121** 0.0117** 0.0115** 
 
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
Constant 0.3416 0.3419 0.2146 0.2848 0.3327 0.2994 0.2877 
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(0.7002) (0.6984) (0.6943) (0.6993) (0.7002) (0.6982) (0.7024) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
R-squared 0.0380 0.0378 0.0378 0.0379 0.0379 0.0379 0.0382 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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F. Robustness analysis 
 
    In this section we study the robustness of our analysis incorporating additional regressors and 
using alternative definitions of parental background and current poverty status. 
 
Country income and initial inequality 
 
    We check whether public expenditure has a similar impact on poverty reduction regardless of 
some contextual variables as country GDP or inequality. The idea is that, in the same way as the 
effect of public expenditure depends on family type, the effect of GDP and inequality on adult 
poverty may also depend on the level of education in the family. In order to do so, we modify 
Equation (1) including two additional interaction terms of expenditure: one with the variable 
GDPct and another one with the variable INEQct. Table 1G below shows the average marginal 
effects corresponding to the variables of interest: public expenditure and parental education. The 
first panel of Table 1G shows the results of Equation (1) where, in addition, PEct is interacted 
with GDPct for our Models 1 to 7 (see Table 3). The second panel of Table 1G shows the results 
for the same seven measures of public expenditure for a model where PEct is interacted with 
INEQct. Finally the bottom panel of Table 6 shows the results for a specification which contains 
interactions of PEct with both GDPct and INEQct. The results we get are similar to those in Table 
3. 
Table 1G: Differential impact of PE by country GDP and Inequality  
        
                
I. Interaction PE 
and GDP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0123*  
       (0.0066) 
      Exp. in compulsory 
educ  
 
-0.0327*** 
      
 
(0.0071) 
     Exp. in primary 
educ 
  
-0.0139*** 
  
-0.0130** -0.0166*** 
 
  
(0.0053) 
  
(0.0056) (0.0063) 
Exp. in secondary 
educ  
   
-0.0170*** 
 
-0.0160*** -0.0197*** 
 
   
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0042) (0.0044) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0035 
 
0.0097** 
 
    
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0048) 
Family educated -0.0688*** -0.0684*** -0.0657*** -0.0688*** -0.0675*** -0.0687*** -0.0694*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
        
        II. Interaction PE and Inequality 
                      
Total exp.  -0.0120*  
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 (0.0066) 
      Exp. in compulsory 
educ  
 
-0.0323*** 
      
 
(0.0067) 
     Exp. in primary 
educ 
  
-0.0142*** 
  
-0.0122** -0.0126** 
 
  
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0051) (0.0058) 
Exp. in secondary 
educ  
   
-0.0154*** 
 
-0.0165*** -0.0227*** 
 
   
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0039) (0.0042) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0034 
 
0.0073 
 
    
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0053) 
Family educated -0.0689*** -0.0684*** -0.0657*** -0.0687*** -0.0676*** -0.0687*** -0.0695*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
        
        III. Interaction PE  with both GDP and 
Inequality 
                     
Total exp.  -0.0120*  
       (0.0066) 
      Exp. in compulsory 
educ  
 
-0.0322*** 
      
 
(0.0066) 
     Exp. in primary 
educ 
  
-0.0141*** 
  
-0.0118** -0.0151** 
 
  
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0054) (0.0062) 
Exp. in secondary 
educ  
   
-0.0169*** 
 
-0.0168*** -0.0229*** 
 
   
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0043) (0.0043) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0033 
 
0.0061 
 
    
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0050) 
Family educated -0.0689*** -0.0684*** -0.0657*** -0.0688*** -0.0676*** -0.0687*** -0.0695*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
        Observations  138,512 139,807 141,701 140,053 144,349 139,807 138,512 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. Public expenditure at 
age 15-17. 
 
Parental background 
 
    Here we check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of parental background. 
In particular, we use the information provided by individuals about the economic situation in the 
household: whether parental household had financial difficulties while the individual was a 
teenager.
1
 
                                                                 
1
 We decided not to use this variable in the main specification of the model for three reasons. First, this 
variable does not take the same categorical values in the two cross sections. Second, this variable is 
missing in four countries in the 2005 cross section (Austria, France, Greece and Portugal), reducing 
considerably sample size. Third, this variable can be seen as a very subjective indicator. Nonetheless, we 
use this variable to check the validity of our results to alternative measures of childhood circumstances. 
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Individuals were asked how frequent financial problems in the household were when they were 
young teenagers. In the 2005 cross section there are five possible answers: 1 (most of the time), 
2 (often), 3 (occasionally), 4 (rarely), and 5 (never). In the 2011 cross section there are six 
possible answers: 1 (very bad), 2 (bad), 3 (moderately bad), 4 (moderately good), 5 (good), and 
6 (very good). We summarized the information of these questions by constructing a dummy 
variable called "poor_past" that takes value 1 when the corresponding variable is either 1 or 2 in 
the 2005 cross section and when it is 1, 2, or 3 in the 2011 cross section. By doing so , we obtain 
comparable frequencies in the two cross sections.  
    In the upper part of Table 2G we present the results of estimating Equation (1), dropping the 
variable EDFAM from the list of regressors, and replacing it with poorpast, which serves as an 
alternative description of parental background. We also include an interaction term between 
public expenditure and poor_past. We lose some observations from the 2005 wave since four 
countries do not report this variable in that wave (Austria, France, Greece, and Portugal). We 
check whether our results change when considering both parental education and past poverty 
status. The results of these estimations are shown in the bottom part of Table 2G. 
Table 2G: Alternative measures of parental background 
        
                
I. Poor family Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0211*** 
       (0.0070) 
      Exp. in compulsory educ  
 
-0.0395*** 
      
 
(0.0077) 
     Exp. in primary educ  
  
-0.0138** 
  
-0.0163*** -0.0189*** 
 
  
(0.0053) 
  
(0.0057) (0.0059) 
Exp. in secondary educ  
   
-0.0210*** 
 
-0.0210*** -0.0242*** 
 
   
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0043) (0.0044) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
-0.0009 
 
0.0081 
     
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0052) 
Family poor  0.0524*** 0.0531*** 0.0528*** 0.0537*** 0.0524*** 0.0531*** 0.0525*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0031) 
        Observations  124,582 125,886 127,794 126,134 130,435 125,886 124,582 
        
        II. Poor family and educated family 
                      
Total exp.  -0.0176** 
       (0.0071) 
      Exp. in compulsory educ  
 
-0.0371*** 
      
 
(0.0078) 
     Exp. in primary educ  
  
-0.0140** 
  
-0.0139** -0.0160*** 
 
  
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0056) (0.0058) 
Exp. in secondary educ  
   
-0.0188*** 
 
-0.0195*** -0.0238*** 
 
   
(0.0042) 
 
(0.0042) (0.0045) 
Exp. in tertiary educ  
    
0.0020 
 
0.0082 
     
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0050) 
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Family poor  0.0382*** 0.0387*** 0.0387*** 0.0388*** 0.0381*** 0.0388*** 0.0383*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Family educated -0.0673*** -0.0662*** -0.0634*** -0.0671*** -0.0665*** -0.0663*** -0.0673*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
        Observations  122,075 123,367 125,251 123,613 127,902 123,367 122,075 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year of birth level. Public 
expenditure at age 15-17. The specification in panel is the one proposed in Equation (1) but substituting the variable 
educated_family for poor_past. The specification in panel II is the one proposed  in Equation (1) but adding the 
poor_past variable to the interaction between PE and educated_family.  
 
    Results are in line with the ones obtained using only parental education (see Table 3). Public 
expenditure is strongly associated with poverty reduction. Since the models we estimate contain 
an interaction term between expenditure and family type, we can compute marginal effects 
separately according to family type. This is what Table 3G shows, for the model that only 
includes poor_past instead of EDFAM. Similar to Table 4 above, in the upper part of the table 
we present the results corresponding to Mode ls 1-5. Below we present the results corresponding 
to Models 6 and 7.  
 
     Table 3G: Decomposition of the marginal effect of public expenditure  
      
            
I. Models 1-5 Total Compulsory Primary Secondary Tertiary 
            
Poor family = 0  -0.0134*  -0.0355*** -0.0090*  -0.0185*** 0.0072 
 
(0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0051) 
      Poor family = 1  -0.0461*** -0.0527*** -0.0294*** -0.0292*** -0.0266*** 
 
(0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0059) (0.0069) 
      Observations  124,582 125,886 127,794 126,134 130,435 
      
      II. Model 6 
                 
Poor family = 0  
  
-0.0129** -0.0203*** 
 
   
(0.0058) (0.0045) 
 
      Poor family = 1  
  
-0.0276*** -0.0233*** 
 
   
(0.0094) (0.0069) 
 
      Observations      125,886 125,886   
      
      III. Model 7  
                 
Poor family = 0  
  
-0.0180*** -0.0277*** 0.0181*** 
   
(0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0053) 
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      Poor family = 1  
  
-0.0219** -0.0129*  -0.0242*** 
   
(0.0098) (0.0077) (0.0083) 
      Observations      124,582 124,582 124,582 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. Public expenditure 
at age 15-17. 
 
    When we disaggregate the effect of expenditure by family type, we find that the negative 
association between public expenditure and poverty for individuals from poor families is 
stronger, in general, than the corresponding association for individuals from non-poor families. 
    Finally, we try an alternative definition of parental background by not categorizing as 
poor those individuals in the 2011 cross section who answered that family situation was 
“moderately bad”. This means that we consider that only those individuals for which the 
corresponding variable is either 1 or 2 were poor. That is, now we present results defining the 
variable poor_past which takes value 1 when the corresponding variable in 2005 and 2011 is 
equal to 1 or 2:   
 
Table 4G: Alternative past poverty definition 
 
        
                
I. Poor family Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  -0.0205*** 
      
 
(0.0071) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0397*** 
     
  
(0.0077) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0140*** 
  
-0.0166*** -0.0188*** 
   
(0.0054) 
  
(0.0057) (0.0059) 
Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0205*** 
 
-0.0209*** -0.0238*** 
    
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0042) (0.0044) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
-0.0004 
 
0.0083 
     
(0.0050) 
 
(0.0053) 
Family poor  0.0611*** 0.0623*** 0.0627*** 0.0628*** 0.0608*** 0.0627*** 0.0621*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0037) 
        Observations  124,582 125,886 127,794 126,134 130,435 125,886 124,582 
        
        II. Poor family and educated family 
                      
Total exp.  -0.0166** 
      
 
(0.0071) 
      Exp. in compulsory education  
 
-0.0363*** 
     
  
(0.0078) 
     Exp. in primary education  
  
-0.0139** 
  
-0.0136** -0.0156*** 
   
(0.0056) 
  
(0.0057) (0.0059) 
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Exp. in secondary education  
   
-0.0183*** 
 
-0.0191*** -0.0234*** 
    
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0042) (0.0045) 
Exp. in tertiary education  
    
0.0027 
 
0.0086* 
     
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0051) 
Family poor  0.0469*** 0.0476*** 0.0482*** 0.0478*** 0.0469*** 0.0478*** 0.0475*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Family educated -0.0685*** -0.0675*** -0.0647*** -0.0681*** -0.0676*** -0.0676*** -0.0687*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
        Observations  122,075 123,367 125,251 123,613 127,902 123,367 122,075 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. The 
specification in panel I is the one proposed in Equation (1) but substituting the variable educated_family for 
poor_past. The specification in panel II is the one proposed in Equation (1) but adding the poor_past variable to 
the interaction between PE and educated_family.  
 
As can be observed, the result is robust to this new definition of poor family.  
    One interesting implication of our analysis so far is as follows. Higher levels of public 
expenditure reduce on average the probability of being poor when adult. Additionally, being 
raised in a non-poor household also reduces the probability of being poor when adult. Then, the 
impact of public expenditure gets amplified in the long-run. Spending more money in today's 
children will make less likely that these kids will be poor when adults. This, in turn, will reduce 
the probability of being poor for next generation's children.
2
 
 
Poverty measure 
 
    Here we check the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of poverty. The poverty 
measure used in the main part of the paper (variable HX080 in the EU-SILC database) uses 
disposable household income (variable HY020). In particular, the poverty indicator takes value 
one if the equivalized disposable household income is below 60% of median equivalized 
household disposable income. This is the official measure of poverty in the European Union. 
Disposable household income is the sum of market income plus social transfers minus taxes and 
social security contributions. Here we consider two alternative definitions of poverty in which 
we exclude some social transfers from household disposable income. We do this to avoid the 
impact of current redistributive policies on poverty status. Social transfers cause some 
individuals to be above the poverty threshold. If we do not take this account we may attribute to 
past public expenditure an effect that is just related to current public transfers and therefore we 
would be overestimating the impact of past public expenditure. 
    Our first alternative measure (gross poverty A) excludes most social transfers, in particular, 
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, education-related allowances, 
family/children related allowances, social exclusion not elsewhere classified and housing 
                                                                 
2
 It can be check that individuals with non-educated parents are indeed differentially poorer: among 
individuals with non-educated parents almost 21% were poor when teenager (poor_past=1) whereas it is 
only 7.47% among indiv iduals with educated-parents. 
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allowances. However it retains old-age benefits and survivor' benefits.
3
 Our second alternative 
(gross-poverty B) is similar to the previous one, but including also unemployment benefits.
4
 
That is, it is an intermediate measure between the previous two ones. The results of estimating 
Equation (1) for Models 1-7 using these two alternative poverty definitions are shown in Table 
5G. 
Table 5G: Overall marginal effects of public expenditure: Gross Poverty 
  
                
I. Gross Poverty 
A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 
                
Total exp.  0.0064 
       (0.0085) 
      Exp. in 
compulsory educ  
 
 
-0.0208** 
     
 
(0.0094) 
     Exp. in primary 
educ 
 
  
-0.0152** 
  
-0.0131*  -0.0216*** 
  
(0.0069) 
  
(0.0073) (0.0073) 
Exp. in 
secondary educ  
 
   
-0.0095 
 
-0.0095 -0.0171*** 
   
(0.0058) 
 
(0.0058) (0.0061) 
Exp. in tertiary 
educ      
0.0176*** 
 
0.0245*** 
    
(0.0061) 
 
(0.0063) 
Family educated -0.1138*** -0.1130*** -0.1102*** -0.1132*** -0.1123*** -0.1132*** -0.1139*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
        Observations  138,536 139,831 141,725 140,077 144,373 139,831 138,536 
        
        II. Gross Poverty 
B 
                       
Total exp.  0.0045 
       (0.0082) 
      Exp. in 
compulsory educ  
 
-0.0217** 
      
 
(0.0090) 
     Exp. in primary 
educ 
  
-0.0122*  
  
-0.0091 -0.0166** 
 
  
(0.0067) 
  
(0.0070) (0.0071) 
Exp. in 
secondary educ  
   
-0.0135** 
 
-0.0134** -0.0202*** 
                                                                 
3
 Our new measure of equivalized disposable household income is equal to the product of total disposable 
household income before social transfers other than old-age and survivor's benefits (HY022), mult iplied 
by an inflation factor for within-household non-response (HY025), divided by equivalized household size 
(HX050). That is, ((HY022∗HY025)/(HX050)).  
4
 Total disposable income now is equal to HY022 plus unemployment benefits (PY090G). In order to 
have the same number of missing observations in the Gross Poverty B and our poverty measure we 
redefine PY090G to be equal to 0 when missing. 
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(0.0056) 
 
(0.0056) (0.0059) 
Exp. in tertiary 
educ  
    
0.0157*** 
 
0.0221*** 
 
    
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0061) 
Family educated -0.1102*** -0.1096*** -0.1068*** -0.1099*** -0.1087*** -0.1098*** -0.1105*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
        Observations  138,536 139,831 141,725 140,077 144,373 139,831 138,536 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. Public expenditure 
at age 15-17. 
 
    In Table 6G we decompose the marginal effect of public expenditure on gross poverty A for 
individuals with educated and non-educated parents. 
 
     Table 6G: Decomposition of the marginal effect of public expenditure  
      
            
I. Models 1-5 Total Compulsory Primary Secondary Tertiary 
            
Educated family = 0  -0.0161*  -0.0383*** -0.0295*** -0.0245*** -0.0014 
 
(0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0062) 
      Educated family = 1  0.0456*** 0.0094 0.0092 0.0164** 0.0511*** 
 
(0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0081) (0.0066) (0.0072) 
      Observations  138,536 139,831 141,725 140,077 144,373 
      
      II. Model 6 
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0149*  -0.0233*** 
 
   
(0.0085) (0.0066) 
 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0098 0.0144** 
 
   
(0.0083) (0.0070) 
 
      Observations      139,831 139,831   
      
      III. Model 7  
                 
Educated family = 0  
  
-0.0212** -0.0236*** 0.0100 
   
(0.0087) (0.0069) (0.0066) 
      Educated family = 1  
  
-0.0224*** -0.0057 0.0497*** 
   
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0079) 
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Observations      138,536 138,536 138,536 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the country -year of birth level. Public expenditure 
at age 15-17. 
    Again we find a strong association between public expenditure and poverty reduction, mostly 
for individuals from poor parental backgrounds. To conclude, the impact of public expenditure 
on poverty reduction is robust to whether current poverty status is measured before or after 
current social transfers. In other words, there is no evidence that we are overestimating the 
impact of past public expenditure. 
 
Placebo treatment 
 
    In this final robustness check of the paper, we perform a falsification exercise. In our main 
specification (Models 1-7) we have analyzed the effect of public expenditure when the 
individual was 15-17 on adult poverty. What we propose to do here is to regress poverty rates in 
adulthood on public expenditure from a different period than the one we are considering in our 
main specification. In particular, to each cohort from a given country, we randomly assign 
public expenditure corresponding to a different cohort from the same country. As an example, 
consider the cohort of individuals born in Austria in 1970. In our main specification we assign 
to these individuals the average of public expenditure in the years 1985-87. What we do now is 
to assign them a different expenditure level chosen randomly from all the expenditure levels 
from the different cohorts in Austria. Once we do this, we estimate again Equation (1) with this 
new measure of public expenditure. We repeat this exercise one hundred times. If the results in 
Section 4 were just spurious correlations, the result of this falsification exercise should have 
little impact on them. We have done this exercise only for public expenditure in secondary 
education, our Model 4. Recall that the marginal effect we obtained (see Table 3) was -0.0158. 
In Figure 4 below we show a histogram of the t-statistics corresponding to the one hundred 
regressions in which we reshuffle the values of public expenditure in secondary education. Only 
in four cases out of 100 we get a value of the t-statistic below -2, while in 9 cases we get a value 
above 2. That is, only in 4 cases we obtain a value of the coefficient of interest that is negative 
and statistically significant. In 9 out of 100 we get a value that is positive and statistically 
significant, while in 87 out of 100 repetitions the coefficient of interest is not statistically 
different from zero. For the sake of comparison, we also estimate the coefficient of the dummy 
variable EDFAMi. In all the 100 repetitions the coefficient of this variable is negative and 
statistically significant. In fact, it changes almost nothing since the lowest value we estimate is -
.0676 and the highest is -.0659. 
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    As can be observed, even though the impact of family education remains significant in all 
cases, the effect of public expenditure is not significant in most cases. These results indicate that 
the actual measures of public expenditure are meaningful determinants of the variation of 
current poverty rates among individuals.  
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Figure 1F: Histogram of t-statistics of 100 repetitions
